Abstract. One of the main di culties for implementing cryptographic schemes based on elliptic curves de ned over nite elds is the necessary computation of the cardinality of these curves. In the case of nite elds IF2n, recent theoretical breakthroughs yield a signi cant speed up of the computations. Once described some of these ideas in the rst part of this paper, we show that our current implementation runs from 2 up to 10 times faster than what was done previously. In the second part, we exhibit a slight change of Schoof's algorithm to choose curves with a number of points \nearly" prime and so construct cryptosystems based on random elliptic curves instead of speci c curves as it used to be.
Introduction
It is well known that the discrete logarithm problem is hard on elliptic curves de ned over nite elds IF q . This is due to the fact that the only known attacks (baby steps giant steps Sha71], Pollard Pol78] and Pohlig-Hellman PH78] methods) are still exponential in log q. So, cryptosystems based on this problem can reach the same level of security as non elliptic versions with slightly higher computation rates and much smaller keys SOOS95, HMV93] .
The remaining di culty to design elliptic cryptosystems is the computation of the cardinality of elliptic curves. Until recently, it was usually admitted that the cost needed to perform this task was too high for randomly chosen curves. To tackle this di culty, one used to consider speci c curves, for instance, supersingular curves Mil87, Kob87, Kal86, BC89, MV90] or curves with complex multiplication Mor91, Kob91, Miy91, Miy93, LZ94, CTT94]. Unfortunately, supersingular curves turned out to be disastrous and so, the use of speci c curves seems to be quite compromised for cryptographical purposes MOV93] .
Thanks to recent theoretical as well as practical developments, the cost of computing the number of points on a randomly chosen curve is no longer prohibitive. For nite elds of characteristic two (specially attractive for industrial applications), the improvements of Schoof's algorithm due to Atkin, Elkies, Morain, Couveignes, M uller, Dewaghe, : : : Sch85, CM94, M ul95, Sch95, CDM96] were signi cantly speeded up by replacing the isogeny computation algorithm of Couveignes Cou94] with a recent heuristic algorithm of the author Ler96] .
In this article, once brie y recalled some basic facts about elliptic curves in Section 2, we describe in Section 3 our current implementation of these ideas and we explain in Section 4 how we can take advantage of Schoof's algorithm for speeding up the search of an elliptic curve with a nearly prime number of points. Among others, it turns out that we are now able to compute the cardinality of any elliptic curve for sizes of nite elds recommended for cryptographical schemes in only a few seconds, that is to say a speed up factor from 2 up to 10 compared to our previous implementation LM95a].
2 Elliptic Curves over IF 2 n Following Men93], we consider for our purposes elliptic curves over IF 2 n de ned by E a : y 2 + xy = x 3 + a; a 2 IF 2 n:
(1) Any non supersingular elliptic curve is isomorphic to a curve or the twist of a curve de ned by this equation. Invariant J a and discriminant a of E a are equal to J a = 1=a and a = a: Let us note that E a can not be supersingular because, in IF 2 n, an elliptic curve is supersingular if and only if its invariant is equal to 0 (on the explicit determination of supersingular curves in nite elds of odd characteristic, see Mor96] ).
The set of points of E a over IF 2 n is E a (IF 2 n) = fO Ea g (x; y) 2 IF 2 2 n; y 2 + xy = x 3 + a :
This set is a nite group and the formulae of the abelian group law are: { 8P = (x P ; y P ) 2 E a (IF 2 n), P + O Ea = O Ea + P = P, ?P = (x P ; y P + x P ); { if P = (x P ; y P ), Q = (x Q ; y Q ), P 6 = ?Q, then, if P = Q, let = x P +y P =x P , otherwise let = (y Q + y P )=(x Q + x P ), and R = P + Q = (x P+Q ; y P+Q ) is obtained by x P+Q = 2 + + x P + x Q ; y P+Q = (x P + x P+Q ) + x P+Q + y P : Some endomorphisms will be of special interest in Section 3, namely m] a , multiplication by any integer m on E a and a , the Frobenius map. These endo- 
Equation (2) shows that there exists a single point P a = (0; p a) of order 2 on these curves and the formulae of the translation by P a are 
Before 1985, the only known methods to compute this number consisted in testing all the possible integers t in Equation (3) with baby steps giant steps variants Sha71]. The complexity of these algorithms is asymptotically O(2 n=4 ).
With the work by Schoof Sch85] and the numerous improvements that followed, it is now possible to compute this cardinality with a probabilistic complexity asymptotically equal to O(n 6 ). We brie y describe this method in Section 3.1.
The heart of these algorithms is the computation of isogenies. In practice, the most e cient method to do that in IF 2 n seems to be a heuristic algorithm due to the author Ler96] and we overview it in Section 3.2. Thanks to this algorithm, rst, we were able to speed up our previous implementation LM95a] by a signi cant factor and secondly, compute the cardinality of an elliptic curve de ned over IF 2 1301 . Lercier's Approach. In nite elds of characteristic two, we exploited that there exists a unique point P a of order 2 on E a . Thus, an isogeny I must satisfy I T a = T b I:
The Schoof-Elkies-Atkin Algorithm
From this, we deduced the following characterization.
Theorem 1. Let E a and E b be two elliptic curves de ned over IF 2 n. Let`be an odd integer, and d = (`? 1)=2. Let I be an isogeny of degree`between E a and E b given by (X; Y ) 7 ! G(X)
where Q(X); G(X); H(X); K(X) in IF 2 n X] with degrees at most d,`, 3d and 2d. Then G(X) = XP 2 (X) where P(X) is a polynomial of degree d such that gcd(P (X); Q(X)) = In order to explicitly compute the isogeny I, it turns out that we have to nd conditions satis ed by the polynomial Q(X). This is achieved from the fact that 
where b P(X) = p P(X 2 ) and b Q(X) = p Q(X 2 ) (polynomials whose coe cients are square roots of coe cients of P(X) and Q(X)).
Even if Equation (8) is a linear equation satis ed by Q(X) over IF 2 , asymptotic complexity to inverse this system is O(`3n). This is too high in practice.
To decrease this complexity, we considered Equation (7) and replaced the resolution of this linear system over IF 2 n by a quadratic system over IF 2 . This yields an algorithm (we do not describe here) whose heurististic complexity is O(`3).
Results
We had an old implementation of the SEA (Schoof, Elkies, Atkin) algorithm including Couveignes's rst algorithm to compute isogenies and using an \ad hoc" C arithmetic of IF 2 n LM95a]. We completely rewrote it with our approach and the formalism of ZEN library CL96a, CL96b] which enables us to handle any nite eld given recursively by a polynomial basis over a sub eld (for instance, IF 2 ). Since we restrict ourselves to the case of the characteristic two in this article, we only give accurate timings for nite elds IF 2 n, even if this implementation allows us to compute the number of points of an elliptic curve de ned over other nite elds Ler97]. Table 2 . Statistics for small nite elds IF2n.
We give:`m ax , the maximal prime used; the number of U (resp. L) primes; #M, the number of combinations; the cumulated time for X 2 n , X 2 nr , Schoof's algorithm; computing isogenies (g`) and t mod`when`is Elkies (k); the time for the match and sort program; the total time. For each category, minimal, maximal and average values are given.
Since for these \small" nite elds, the time needed to compute isogenies is negligible, we only gain a speed up factor from 1:1 up to 1:8 thanks in part to the arithmetic of ZEN which is faster than the arithmetic of our old implementation. Table 3 . Statistics for larger nite elds IF2n.
At this point, the advantage of our approach clearly appears. The time needed to compute isogenies is (completely) negligible while it used to be the main cost in LM95a] and we gain a speed up factor from 4 up to 10 on the whole computation.
To compare Couveignes's and Lercier's approaches for two huge nite elds, we collected the same data in Table 4 To improve the SEA algorithm, future implementation should now optimize computations of X 2 n mod . Table 4 . Timings for huge nite elds (days/hours).
4 Finding Random Elliptic Curves with Nearly Prime Cardinality E ciently.
Since the best known attacks against the discrete logarithm problem on elliptic curves are 1. the Weil pairing reduction for supersingular curves, 2. the baby steps giant steps, Pollard-and Pohlig Helman algorithms for other curves, \good curves" for cryptographical purposes only have to be de ned in a not too small nite eld and to be of \nearly prime" cardinality (to avoid point 2.) di erent from 2 n , 2 n + 1 p 2 n , 2 n + 1 p 2 n+1 and 2 n + 1 2 p 2 n (to avoid point 1.) if de ned over IF 2 n.
In Section 4.1, we describe an early abort strategy suggested by Morain that takes advantage of the SEA algorithm to quickly throw away most of the curves which do not meet this condition. For convenience, we explain it only in the case of elliptic curves E a de ned over IF 2 n. But this strategy obviously works in any nite eld. Then we give timing and examples of \good curves" provided by this strategy.
Early Abort Strategy
The Algorithm. An elliptic curve E a given by Equation (1) is non supersingular and has a point Q a = ( 4 p a; p a) of order 4. Thus, the previous condition can be reformulated as follows : \A good curve E a is a curve de ned over IF 2 n with n 60 whose cardinality is 4 times a prime".
To nd such \good curves", we proceed as follows:
1. Choose an element a 2 IF 2 n at random.
2. As explained in Section 3, compute t mod`with the SEA algorithm checking during the computation that, for each Elkies prime`6 = 2, Otherwise, this means that the number of points of the curve is divisible bỳ . In this case, go to step 1. 3. Check that the cardinality of the curve is 4 times a prime, otherwise go to step 1.
First of all, let us note that when 2 n + 1 ? t mod`= 0 for a prime`, this means there is a point of order`in E a . Therefore, there exists an isogeny of degree`de ned from E a , and`is necessarily an Elkies prime.
Let us observe too that it is better to test the primality of the cardinality at step 3., rst, by a pseudo primality test, and then by an exact primality prover (for instance ECPP Mor90]). But for practical reasons, we used MAPLE system CGGW85].
In practice, this algorithm works well because most of the time a curve does not have a prime cardinality, we will see in Section 4.1 that this cardinality is divided by a small integer. Since we choose primes`as small as possible in the SEA algorithm, we detect such a curve quickly. In our particular case, we test random curves E a de ned over IF 2 n with cardinalities always divisible by 4, so, we make the strong assumption that Howe's theorem applies, except for`= 2, and the probabilities r 2 n(`k) become n (`k) = for`= 2 and k > 1; r 2 n(`k) for`> 2:
Consequently, the probability n (`) we detect at step 2. of the algorithm that an odd prime`divides the cardinality of E a is equal to n (`) = n (`)(1 ? n (2 3 )) Y odd primes <`( 1 ? n ( )):
This quantity can be easily computed for n xed but for any n, one Table 5 . In this table, it turns out that the theoretical estimations of Section 4.1 are in practice satis ed most of the time, except maybe for the number of cardinalities divisible by 5 in IF 2 196 (150 instead of 1000 25=394 ' 65). In any case, the probability that an elliptic curve has its number of points divisible by a small prime`is quite high and thus we need to compute the cardinality of a curve completely in only a few case. Some of these \good curves" are given in Table 6 with the notation a 0 + a 1 2 + + a n?1 2 n?1 = a 0 + a 1 T + + a n?1 T n?1 :
Conclusion
Thanks to the contribution of many people in this eld of research, computing the number of points of an elliptic curve de ned over IF 2 n can be performed quickly in practice. From this, we derived an e cient way for nding elliptic curves with nearly prime cardinality. Even if it is harder to obtain such curves when n increases (only 2 among 1000 for n = 196), we think this method is of special interest for cryptographic purposes.
Performances Table 6 . Curves with a nearly prime cardinality.
